

ON MULTIPLE REALITIES

In a famous chapter of his *Principles of Psychology* William James analyzes our sense of reality.¹ Reality, so he states, means simply relation to our emotional and active life. The origin of all reality is subjective, whatever excites and stimulates our interest is real. To call a thing real means that this thing stands in a certain relation to ourselves. "The word 'real' is, in short, a fringe."² Our primitive impulse is to affirm immediately the reality of all that is conceived, as long as it remains uncontradicted. But there are several, probably an infinite number of various orders of realities, each with its own special and separate style of existence. James calls them "sub-universes" and mentions as examples the world of sense or physical things (as the paramount reality), the world of science, the world of ideal relations, the world of "idols of the tribe", the various supernatural worlds of mythology and religion, the various worlds of individual opinion, the worlds of sheer madness and vagary.³ The popular mind conceives of all these sub-worlds more or less disconnectedly, and when dealing with one of them forgets for the time being its relations to the rest. But every object we think of is at last referred to one of these subworlds. "Each world whilst it is attended to is real after its own fashion; only the reality lapses with the attention."⁴

With these remarks James' genius has touched on one of the most important philosophical questions. Intentionally restricting his inquiry to the psychological aspect of the problem, he has refrained from embarking upon an investigation of the many

¹ *Lac. cit.*, Vol. II, Chapter XXI, pp. 283-322. ¹

Ibid., p. 320.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 293-294.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 293.

implications involved. The following considerations, fragmentary as they are, attempt to outline a first approach to some of them with the special aim of clarifying the relationship between the reality of the world of daily life and that of theoretical, scientific contemplation.

I. THE REALITY OF THE WORLD OF DAILY LIFE

i) The natural attitude of daily life and its pragmatic motive

We begin with an analysis of the world of daily life which the wide-awake, grown-up man who acts in it and upon it amidst his fellow-men experiences within the natural attitude as a reality.

"World of daily life" shall mean the intersubjective world which existed long before our birth, experienced and interpreted by Others, our predecessors, as an organized world. Now it is given to our experience and interpretation. All interpretation of this world is based upon a stock of previous experiences of it, our own experiences and those handed down to us by our parents and teachers, which in the form of "knowledge at hand" function as a scheme of reference.

To this stock of experiences at hand belongs our knowledge that the world we live in is a world of well circumscribed objects with definite qualities, objects among which we move, which resist us and upon which we may act. To the natural attitude the world is not and never has been a mere aggregate of colored spots, incoherent noises, centers of warmth and cold. Philosophical or psychological analysis of the constitution of our experiences may afterwards, retrospectively, describe how elements of this world affect our senses, how we passively perceive them in an indistinct and confused way, how by active apperception our mind singles out certain features from the perceptual field, conceiving them as well delineated things which stand out over against a more or less unarticulated background or horizon. The natural attitude does not know these problems. To it the world is from the outset not the private world of the single individual but an intersubjective world, common to all of us, in which we have not a theoretical but an eminently practical interest. The world

of everyday life is the scene and also the object of our actions and interactions. We have to dominate it and we have to change it in order to realize the purposes which we pursue within it among our fellow-men. We work and operate not only within but upon the world. Our bodily movements - kinaesthetic, locomotive, operative - gear, so to speak, into the world, modifying or changing its objects and their mutual relationships. On the other hand, these objects offer resistance to our acts which we have either to overcome or to which we have to yield. Thus, it may be correctly said that a pragmatic motive governs our natural attitude toward the world of daily life. World, in this sense, is something that we have to modify by our actions or that modifies our actions.

2) The manifestations of man's spontaneous life in the outer world and some of its forms

But what has to be understood under the term "action" just used? How does man with the natural attitude experience his own "actions" within and upon the world? Obviously, "actions" are manifestations of man's spontaneous life. But neither does he experience all such manifestations as actions nor does he experience all of his actions as bringing about changes in the outer world. Unfortunately the different forms of all these experiences are not clearly distinguished in present philosophical thought and, therefore, no generally accepted terminology exists.

In vain would we look for help to modern behaviorism and its distinction between overt and covert behavior, to which categories a third, that of subovert behavior, has sometimes been added in order to characterize the manifestation of spontaneity in acts of speech. It is not our aim here to criticise the basic fallacy of the behavioristic point of view or to discuss the inadequacy and inconsistency of the trichotomy just mentioned. For our purpose it suffices to show that the behavioristic interpretation of spontaneity can contribute nothing to the question we are concerned with, namely, how the different forms of spontaneity are experienced by the mind in which they originate. At its best, behaviorism is a scheme of reference useful to the

observer of other people's behavior. He, and only he, might be interested in considering the activities of men or animals under a relational scheme of reference such as stimulus-response, or organism-environment, and only from his point of view are these categories accessible at all. Our problem, however, is not what occurs to man as a psychophysiological unit, but the attitude he adopts toward these occurrences - briefly, the subjective meaning man bestows upon certain experiences of his own spontaneous life. What appears to the observer to be objectively the same behavior may have for the behaving subject very different meanings or no meaning at all.

Meaning, as has been shown elsewhere,⁵ is not a quality inherent in certain experiences emerging within our stream of consciousness but the result of an interpretation of a past experience looked at from the present Now with a reflective attitude. As long as I live *in* my acts, directed toward the objects of these acts, the acts do not have any meaning. They become meaningful if I grasp them as well-circumscribed experiences of the past and, therefore, in retrospect. Only experiences which can be recollected beyond their actuality and which can be questioned about their constitution are, therefore, subjectively meaningful.

But if this characterization of meaning has been accepted, are there any experiences at all of my spontaneous life which are subjectively not meaningful? We think the answer is in the affirmative. There are the mere physiological reflexes, such as the knee jerk, the contraction of the pupil, blinking, blushing; moreover certain passive reactions provoked by what Leibniz calls the surf of indiscernible and confused small perceptions; furthermore, my gait, my facial expression, my mood, those manifestations of my spontaneous life which result in certain characteristics of my handwriting open to graphological interpretation, etc. All these forms of involuntary spontaneity are experienced while they occur, but without leaving any trace in memory; as experiences they are, to borrow again a term from Leibniz, most suitable for this peculiar problem, *perceived but, not apperceived*. Unstable and undetachable from surrounding

⁵ A. Schutz, *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt*, and ed., Vienna, 1960, pp. 29-43, 72-93-

experiences as they are, they can neither be delineated nor recollected. They belong to the category of *essentially actual experiences*, that is, they exist merely in the actuality of being experienced and cannot be grasped by a reflective attitude.⁶

Subjectively meaningful experiences emanating from our spontaneous life shall be called *conduct*. (We avoid the term "behavior" because it includes in present use also subjectively non-meaningful manifestations of spontaneity such as reflexes.) The term "conduct" - as used here - refers to all kinds of subjectively meaningful experiences of spontaneity, be they those of inner life or those gearing into the outer world. If it is permitted to use objective terms in a description of subjective experiences - and after the preceding clarification the danger of misunderstanding no longer exists - we may say that conduct can be overt or covert. The former shall be called *mere doing*, the latter *mere thinking*. However, the term "conduct" as used here does not imply any reference to intent. All kinds of so-called automatic activities of inner or outer life - habitual, traditional, affectual ones - fall under this class, called by Leibniz the "class of empirical behavior."

Conduct which is devised in advance, that is, which is based upon a preconceived project, shall be called *action*, regardless of whether it is overt or covert. As to the latter, it has to be distinguished whether or not there supervenes on the project an intention to realize it - to carry it through, to bring about the projected state of affairs. Such an intention transforms the mere forethought into an aim and the project into a purpose. If an intention to realization is lacking, the projected covert action remains a phantasm, such as a day-dream; if it subsists, we may speak of a purposive action or a *performance*. An example of a covert action which is a performance is the process of projected thinking such as the attempt to solve a scientific problem mentally.

As to the so-called overt actions, that is, actions which gear

⁶ As to the "reflective attitude" cf. Marvin Farber, *The Foundation of Phenomenology*, Cambridge, 1943, pp. 523ff.; also pp. 378ff.; cf. furthermore Dorion Cairns: "An Approach to Phenomenology," in *Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl*, ed. by M. Farber, Cambridge, 1940; p. 8 f. The concept of "essentially actual experiences," however, cannot be found in Husserl's writings. Husserl's view was that, as a matter of principle, every act can be grasped in reflection.

into the outer world by bodily movements, the distinction between actions without and those with an intention to realization is not necessary. Any overt action is a performance within the meaning of our definition. In order to distinguish the (covert) performances of mere thinking from those (overt) requiring bodily movements we shall call the latter *working*.

Working, then, is action in the outer world, based upon a project and characterized by the intention to bring about the projected state of affairs by bodily movements. Among all the described forms of spontaneity that of working is the most important one for the constitution of the reality of the world of daily life. As will be shown very soon, the wide-awake self integrates in its working and by its working its present, past, and future into a specific dimension of time; it realizes itself as a totality in its working acts; it communicates with Others through working acts; it organizes the different spatial perspectives of the world of daily life through working acts. But before we can turn to these problems we have to explain what the term "wide-awake self," just used, means.

3) *The tensions of consciousness and the attention to life*

One of the central points of Bergson's philosophy is his theory that our conscious life shows an indefinite number of different planes, ranging from the plane of action on one extreme to the plane of dream at the other. Each of these planes is characterized by a specific tension of consciousness, the plane of action showing the highest, that of dream the lowest degree of tension. According to Bergson, these different degrees of tension of our consciousness are functions of our varying interest in life, action representing our highest interest in meeting reality and its requirements, dream being complete lack of interest. *Attention a la vie*, attention to life, is, therefore, the basic regulative principle of our conscious life. It defines the realm of our world which is relevant to us; it articulates our continuously flowing stream of thought; it determines the span and function of our memory; it makes us - in our language - either live within our present experiences, directed toward their objects, or turn back in a reflective

attitude to our past experiences and ask for their meaning.⁷ By the term "*wide-awakeness*" we want to denote a plane of consciousness of highest tension originating in an attitude of full attention to life and its requirements. Only the performing and especially the working self is fully interested in life and, hence, wide-awake. It lives within its acts and its attention is exclusively directed to carrying its project into effect, to executing its plan. This attention is an active, not a passive one. Passive attention is the opposite to full awakensness. In passive attention I experience, for instance, the surf of indiscernible small perceptions which are, as stated before, essentially actual experiences and not meaningful manifestations of spontaneity. Meaningful spontaneity may be defined with Leibniz as the effort to arrive at other and always other perceptions. In its lowest form it leads to the delimitation of certain perceptions transforming them into apperception; in its highest form it leads to the performance of working which gears into the outer world and modifies it.

The concept of wide-awakeness reveals the starting point for a legitimate⁸ pragmatic interpretation of our cognitive life. The state of full awakensness of the working self traces out that segment of the world which is pragmatically relevant, and these relevances determine the form and content of our stream of thought: the form, because they regulate the tension of our memory and therewith the scope of our past experiences recollected and of our future experiences anticipated; the content, because all these experiences undergo specific attentional

⁷ The presentation given above does not strictly follow Bergson's terminology but it is hoped that it renders adequately his important thought. Here is a selection of some passages of Bergson's writings significant for our problem: *Essai sur Us domnies immediates de la conscience*, Paris, 1889, pp. 2off; pp. 94-106; *Maliere et Me moire*, Paris, 1897, pp. 189-195; 224-233; *Le reve* (1901) [in *L'Energie spirituelle*, Paris, 1919, pp. 108-111]; *L'effort intellectuel* (1902) [*ibid.*, pp. 164-171]; "Introduction a la metaphysique" (1903) [in *La Pensee et le Mouvant*, Paris, 1934, pp. 233-238]; "Le souvenir du present et la fausse reconnaissance" (1908) [*L'Energie spirituelle*, pp. 12g-i37]; "La conscience et la vie" (1911) [*ibid.*, pp. 15-18]; "La perception du changement" (1911) [in *La Pensee et le Mouvant*, pp. 171-175; pp. igo-igs]; "Fant&mes de vivants" et "recherche psychique" (1913) [*L'Energie spirituelle*, pp. 80-84]; "De la position des problemes" (1922) [*La Pensee et le Mouvant*, pp. giff].

⁸ With very few exceptions, vulgar pragmatism does not consider the problems of the constitution of conscious life involved in the notion of an *ego agens* or *homo faber* from which as a givenness most of the writers start. For the most part, pragmatism is, therefore, just a common-sense description of the attitude of man within the world of working in daily life, but not a philosophy investigating the presuppositions of such a situation.

modifications by the preconceived project and its carrying into effect. This leads us immediately into an analysis of the time dimension in which the working self experiences its own acts.

4) *The time perspectives of the "ego agens" and their unification*

We start by making a distinction that refers to actions in general, covert and overt between action as an ongoing process, as acting in progress (*actio*) on the one hand, and action as performed act, as the thing done (*actum*) on the other hand. Living in my acting-in-progress, I am directed toward the state of affairs to be brought about by this acting. But, then, I do not have in view my experiences of this ongoing process of acting. In order to bring them into view I have to turn back with a reflective attitude to my acting. As Dewey once formulated it, I have to stop and think. If I adopt this reflective attitude, it is, however, not my ongoing acting that I can grasp. What alone I can grasp is rather my performed act (my past acting) or, if my acting still continues while I turn back, the performed initial phases (my present acting). While I lived in my acting in progress it was an element of my vivid present. Now this present has turned into past, and the vivid experience of my acting in progress has given place to my recollection of having acted or to the retention of having been acting. Seen from the actual present in which I adopt the reflective attitude, my past or present perfect acting is conceivable only in terms of acts performed by me.

Thus I may either live in the ongoing process of my acting, directed toward its object, and experience my acting in the Present Tense (*modo presenti*), or I may, so to speak, step out of the ongoing flux and look by a reflective glance at the acts performed in previous processes of acting in the Past Tense or Present Perfect Tense (*modo praeterito*). This does not mean that -according to what was stated in a previous section - merely the performed acts are meaningful but not the ongoing actions. We have to keep in mind that, by definition, action is always based upon a preconceived project, and it is this reference to the preceding project that makes both the acting and the act meaningful.

But what is the time structure of a projected action? When projecting my action, I am, as Dewey puts it,⁹ rehearsing my future action in imagination. This means, I anticipate the outcome of my future action. I look in my imagination at this anticipated action as the thing which *will have been done*, the act which *will have been performed* by me. In projecting, I look at my act in the Future Perfect Tense, I think of it *modo futuri exacti*. But these anticipations are empty and may or may not be fulfilled by the action once performed. The past or present perfect act, however, shows no such empty anticipations. What was empty in the project has or has not been fulfilled. Nothing remains unsettled, nothing undecided. To be sure, I may remember the open anticipations involved in projecting the act and even the protentions accompanying my living in the ongoing process of my acting. But now, in retrospection, I remember them in terms of my *past* anticipations, which have or have not come true. Only the performed act, therefore, and never the acting in progress can turn out as a success or failure.

What has been stated so far holds good for all kinds of actions. But now we have to turn to the peculiar structure of working as bodily performance in the outer world. Bergson's and also Husserl's investigations have emphasized the importance of our bodily movements for the constitution of the outer world and its time perspective. We experience our bodily movements simultaneously on two different planes: inasmuch as they are movements in the outer world we look at them as events happening in space and spatial time, measurable in terms of the path run through; inasmuch as they are experienced together from within as happening changes, as manifestations of our spontaneity pertaining to our stream of consciousness, they partake of our inner time or *duree*. What occurs in the outer world belongs to the same time dimension in which events in inanimate nature occur. It can be registered by appropriate devices and measured by our chronometers. It is the spatialized, homogeneous time which is the universal form of objective or cosmic time. On the other hand, it is the inner time or *duree* within which our actual experiences are connected with the past by recollections and retentions and

⁹ *Human Nature and Conduct*, New York, 1922, Part III, Section III: "The Nature of Deliberation."

with the future by protentions and anticipations. In and by our bodily movements we perform the transition from our *durée* to the spatial or cosmic time, and our working actions partake of both. In simultaneity we experience the working action as a series of events in outer and in inner time, unifying both dimensions into a single flux which shall be called the *vivid present*. The vivid present originates, therefore, in an intersection of *durée* and cosmic time.

Living in the vivid present in its ongoing working acts, directed toward the objects and objectives to be brought about, the working self experiences itself as the originator of the ongoing actions and, thus, as an undivided total self. It experiences its bodily movements from within; it lives in the correlated essentially actual experiences which are inaccessible to recollection and reflection; its world is a world of open anticipations. The working self, and only the working self, experiences all this *modo presenti* and, experiencing itself as the author of this ongoing working, it realizes itself as a unity.

But if the self in a reflective attitude turns back to the working acts performed and looks at them *modo praeterito* this unity goes to pieces. The self which performed the past acts is no longer the undivided total self, but rather a partial self, the performer of this particular act that refers to a system of correlated acts to which it belongs. This partial self is merely the taker of a role or - to use with all necessary reserve a rather equivocal term which James and Mead have introduced into the literature - a Me.

We cannot enter here into a thorough discussion of the difficult implications here involved. This would require a presentation and criticism of G. H. Mead's rather incomplete and inconsistent attempt to approach these problems. We restrict ourselves to pointing to the distinction Mead makes between the totality of the acting self, which he calls the "I," and the partial selves of performed acts, the takers of roles, which he calls the "Me's." So far, the thesis presented in this paper converges with Mead's analysis. And there is, furthermore, agreement with Mead's statement that the "I" gets into experience only after it has carried out the act and thus appears

experientially as a part of the Me, that is, the Me appears in our experience in memory.¹⁰

For our purpose the mere consideration that the inner experiences of our bodily movements, the essentially actual experiences, and the open anticipations escape the grasping by the reflective attitude shows with sufficient clearness that the past self can never be more than a partial aspect of the total one which realizes itself in the experience of its ongoing working.

One point relating to the distinction between (overt) working and (covert) performing has to be added. In the case of a mere performance, such as the attempt to solve a mathematical problem mentally, I can, if my anticipations are not fulfilled by the outcome and I am dissatisfied with the result, cancel the whole process of mental operations and restart from the beginning. Nothing will have changed in the outer world, no vestige of the annulled process will remain. Mere mental actions are, in this sense, revocable. Working, however, is irrevocable. My work has changed the outer world. At best, I may restore the initial situation by countermoves but I cannot make undone what I have done. That is why - from the moral and legal point of view - I am responsible for my deeds but not for my thoughts. That is also why I have the freedom of choice between several possibilities merely with respect to the mentally projected work, before this work has been carried through in the outer world or, at least, while it is being carried through in vivid present, and, thus, still open to modifications. In terms of the past there is no possibility for choice. Having realized my work or at least portions of it, I chose once for all what has been done and have now to bear the consequences. I cannot choose what I want to have done.

¹⁰ Cf. G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*, Chicago, 1934, pp. 173-175, 196-198, 203; "The Genesis of the Self," reprinted in *The Philosophy of the Present*, Chicago, 1932, pp. 176-195, esp. pp. 184ff.; "What Social Objects Must Psychology Presuppose?," *Journal of Philosophy* Vol. VIII, 1910, pp. 174-180; "The Social Self," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. X, 1913, pp. 374-380. See also Alfred Stafford Clayton's excellent book on G. H. Mead: *Emergent Mind and Education*, New York, 1943, pp. 136-141, esp. p. 137. It is doubtless Mead's merit to have seen the relations between act, self, memory, time, and reality. The position of the present paper is of course not reconcilable with Mead's theory of the social origin of the self and with his (modified) behaviorism which induces him to interpret all the beforementioned phenomena in terms of stimulus-response. There is much more truth in the famous chapter (X) of James' *Principles of Psychology*, in which not only the distinction between Me and I can be found, but also its reference to bodily movements, memory, and the sense of time.

So far our analysis has dealt with the time structure of action -and, as a corollary, with the time structure of the self - within the insulated stream of consciousness of the single individual, as if the wide-awake man within the natural attitude could be thought of as separated from his fellow-men. Such a fictitious abstraction was, of course, merely made for the sake of clearer presentation of the problems involved. We have now to turn to the social structure of the world of working.

5) *The social structure of the world of daily life*

We stated before that the world of daily life into which we are born is from the outset an intersubjective world. This implies on the one hand that this world is not my private one but common to all of us; on the other hand that within this world there exist fellow-men with whom I am connected by manifold social relationships. I work not only upon inanimate things but also upon my fellow-men, induced by them to act and inducing them to react. Without entering here into a detailed discussion of the structure and constitution of social relationship, we may mention just as an example of one of its many forms that my performed acts may motivate the Other to react, and vice versa. My questioning the Other, for instance, is undertaken with the intention of provoking his answer, and his answering is motivated by my question. This is one of the many types of "social actions." It is that type in which the "in-order-to motives" of my action become "because motives" of the partner's reaction.*

Social actions involve communication, and any communication is necessarily founded upon acts of working. In order to communicate with Others I have to perform overt acts in the outer world which are supposed to be interpreted by the Others as signs of what I mean to convey. Gestures, speech, writing, etc., are based upon bodily movements. So far, the behavioristic interpretation of communication is justified. It goes wrong by identifying the vehicle of communication, namely the working act, with the communicated meaning itself.

Let us examine the mechanism of communication from the point of view of the interpreter. I may find as given to my

* See "Choosing Among Projects of Action," p. 69 f. (M.N.)

interpretation either the ready-made outcome of the Other's communicating acts or I may attend in simultaneity the ongoing process of his communicating actions as they proceed. The former is, for instance, the case, if I have to interpret a signpost erected by the Other or an implement produced by him. The latter relation prevails, if I am listening to my partner's talk. (There are many variations of these basic types, such as the reading of the Other's letter in a kind of quasi-simultaneity with the ongoing communicating process.) He builds up the thought he wants to convey to me step by step, adding word to word, sentence to sentence, paragraph to paragraph. While he does so, my interpreting actions follow his communicating ones, in the same rhythm. We both, I and the Other, experience the ongoing process of communication in a vivid present. Articulating his thought, while speaking, in phases, the communicator does not merely experience what he actually utters; a complicated mechanism of retentions and anticipations connects within his stream of consciousness one element of his speech with what preceded and what will follow to the unity of the thought he wants to convey. All these experiences belong to his inner time. And there are, on the other hand, the occurrences of his speaking, brought about by him in the spatiah'zed time of the outer world. Briefly, the communicator experiences the ongoing process of communicating as a working in his vivid present.

And I, the listener, experience for my part my interpreting actions also as happening in my vivid present, although this interpreting is not a working, but merely a performing within the meaning of our definitions. On the one hand, I experience the occurrences of the Other's speaking in outer time; on the other hand, I experience my interpreting as a series of retentions and anticipations happening in my inner time interconnected by my aim to understand the Other's thought as a unit.

Now let us consider that the occurrence in the outer world - the communicator's speech - is, while it goes on, an element common to his and my vivid present, both of which are, therefore, simultaneous. My participating in simultaneity in the ongoing process of the Other's communicating establishes therefore a new dimension of time. He and I, *we* share, while the process lasts, a common vivid present, *our* vivid present, which enables him and

me to say: "*We* experienced this occurrence together." By the We-relation, thus established, we both - he, addressing himself to me, and I, listening to him, - are living in our mutual vivid present, directed toward the thought to be realized in and by the communicating process. *We grow older together.*

So far our analysis of communication in the vivid present of the We-relation has been restricted to the time perspective involved. We have now to consider the specific functions of the Other's bodily movements as an expressional field open to interpretation as signs of the Other's thought. It is clear that the extension of this field, even if communication occurs in vivid present, may vary considerably. It will reach its maximum if there exists between the partners community not only of time but also of space, that is, in the case of what sociologists call a face-to-face relation.

To make this clearer let us keep to our example of the speaker and the listener and analyze the interpretable elements included in such a situation. There are first the words uttered in the meaning they have according to dictionary and grammar in the language used plus the additional fringes they receive from the context of the speech and the supervening connotations originating in the particular circumstances of the speaker. There is, furthermore, the inflection of the speaker's voice, his facial expression, the gestures which accompany his talking. Under normal circumstances merely the conveyance of the thought by appropriately selected words has been projected by the speaker and constitutes, therefore, "working" according to our definition. The other elements within the interpretable field are from the speaker's point of view not planned and, therefore, at best mere conduct (mere doing) or even mere reflexes and, then, essentially actual experiences without subjective meaning. Nevertheless, they, too, are integral elements of the listener's interpretation of the Other's state of mind. The community of space permits the partner to apprehend the Other's bodily expressions not merely as events in the outer world, but as factors of the communicating process itself, although they do not originate in working acts of the communicator.

Not only does each partner in the face-to-face relationship share the other in a vivid present; each of them with all manifes-

tations of his spontaneous life is also an element of the other's surroundings; both participate in a set of common experiences of the outer world into which either's working acts may gear. And, finally, in the face-to-face relationship (and only in it) can the partner look at the self of his fellow-man as an unbroken totality in a vivid present. This is of special importance because, as shown before, I can look at my own self only *modo praeterito* and then grasp merely a partial aspect of this my past self, myself as a performer of a role, as a Me.

All the other manifold social relationships are derived from the originary experiencing of the totality of the Other's self in the community of time and space. Any theoretical analysis of the notion of "environment" - one of the least clarified terms used in present social sciences - would have to start from the face-to-face relation as a basic structure of the world of daily life.

We cannot enter here into the details of the framework of these derived relationships. For our problem it is important that in none of them does the self of the Other become accessible to the partner as a unity. The Other appears merely as a partial self, as originator of these and those acts, which I do not share in a vivid present. The shared vivid present of the We-relation presupposes co-presence of the partners. To each type of derived social relationship belongs a particular type of time perspective which is derived from the vivid present. There is a particular quasi-present in which I interpret the mere outcome of the Other's communicating - the written letter, the printed book - without having participated in the ongoing process of communicating acts. There are other time dimensions in which I am connected with contemporaries I never met, or with predecessors or with successors; historical time, in which I experience the actual present as the outcome of past events; and many more. All of these time perspectives can be referred to a vivid present: my own actual or former one, or the actual or former vivid present of my fellow-man with whom, in turn, I am connected in an originary or derived vivid present. All this occurs in the different modes of potentiality or quasi-actuality, each type having its own forms of temporal diminution and augmentation and its appurtenant style of skipping in a direct move or "knight's move." There are furthermore the different forms of overlapping and interpenetrat-

ing of these different perspectives, their being put into and out of operation by a shift from one to the other and a transformation of one into the other, and the different types of synthesizing and combining or isolating and disentangling them. Manifold as these different time perspectives and their mutual relations are, they all originate in an intersection of *duree* and cosmic time.

In and by our social life within the natural attitude they are apprehended as integrated into a single supposedly homogeneous dimension of time which embraces not only all the individual time perspectives of each of us during his wide-awake life but which is common to all of us. We shall call it the civic or *standard time*. It, too, is an intersection of cosmic time and inner time, though, as to the latter, merely of a peculiar aspect of inner time -that aspect in which the wide-awake man experiences his working acts as events within his stream of consciousness. Because standard time partakes of cosmic time, it is measurable by our clocks and calendars. Because it coincides with our inner sense of time in which we experience our working acts, if - and only if - we are wide-awake, it governs the system of our plans under which we subsume our projects, such as plans for life, for work and leisure. Because it is common to all of us, standard time makes an intersubjective coordination of the different individual plan systems possible. Thus, to the natural attitude, the civic or standard time is in the same sense the universal temporal structure of the intersubjective world of everyday life within the natural attitude, in which the earth is its universal spatial structure that embraces the spatial environments of each of us.

6) *The strata of reality in the everyday world of working*

The wide-awake man within the natural attitude is primarily interested in that sector of the world of his everyday life which is within his scope and which is centered in space and time around himself. The place which my body occupies within the world, my actual Here, is the starting point from which I take my bearing in space. It is, so to speak, the center *0* of my system of coordinates. Relatively to my body I group the elements of my surroundings under the categories of right and left, before and behind, above and below, near and far, and so on. And in a

similar way my actual Now is the origin of all the time perspectives under which I organize the events within the world such as the categories of fore and aft, past and future, simultaneity and succession, etc.

Within this basic scheme of orientation, however, the world of working is structurized in various strata of reality. It is the great merit of Mead¹¹ to have analyzed the structurization of the reality at least of the physical thing in its relationship to human action, especially to the actual manipulation of objects with the hands. It is what he calls the "manipulatory area" which constitutes the core of reality. This area includes those objects which are both seen and handled, in contradistinction to the distant objects which cannot be experienced by contact but still lie in the visual field. Only experiences of physical things within the manipulatory area permit the basic test of all reality, namely resistance, only they define what Mead calls the "standard sizes" of things which appear outside the manipulatory area in the distortions of optical perspectives.

This theory of the predominance of the manipulatory area certainly converges with the thesis suggested by this paper, namely, that the world of our working, of bodily movements, of manipulating objects and handling things and men constitutes the specific reality of everyday life. For our purpose, however, the otherwise most important distinction between objects experienced by contact and distant objects is not of primary importance. It could easily be shown that this dichotomy originates in Mead's basic behavioristic position and his uncritical use of the stimulus-response scheme. We, on the other hand, are concerned with the natural attitude of the wide-awake, grown-up man in daily life. He always disposes of a stock of previous experiences, among them the notion of distance as such and of the possibility of overcoming distance by acts of working, namely locomotions. In the natural attitude the visual perception of the distant object implies, therefore, the anticipation that the distant object can be brought into contact by locomotion, in which case the distorted perspective of the objects will disappear and their "standard sizes" reestablished. This anticipation like

¹¹ *The Philosophy of the Present*, Chicago, 1932, pp. 124-125; *The Philosophy of the Act*, Chicago, 1938, pp. 103-106, 121ff., 151ff., 190-192, 196-197, 282-284.

-any other may or may not stand the test of the supervening -actual experience. Its refutation by experience would mean that the distant object under consideration does not pertain to the world of my working. A child may request to touch the stars. To the grown-up within the natural attitude they are shining points outside the sphere of his working, and this holds true even if he uses their position as a means for finding his bearings.

For our purposes, therefore, we suggest calling the stratum of the world of working which the individual experiences as the kernel of his reality the *world within his reach*. This world of his includes not only Mead's manipulatory area but also things within the scope of his view and the range of his hearing, moreover not only the realm of the world open to his actual but also the adjacent ones of his potential working. Of course, these realms have no rigid frontiers, they have their halos and open horizons and these are subject to modifications of interests and attentional attitudes. It is clear that this whole system of "world within my reach" undergoes changes by any of my locomotions; by displacing my body I shift the center θ of my system of coordinates, and this alone changes all the numbers (coordinates) pertaining to this system.

We may say that the world within my actual reach belongs essentially to the present tense. The world within my potential reach, however, shows a more complicated time structure. At least two zones of potentiality have to be distinguished. To the first, which refers to the past, belongs what was formerly within my actual reach and what, so I assume, can be brought back into my actual reach again (*world within restorable reach*). The assumption involved is based upon the idealizations, governing all conduct in the natural sphere, namely, that I may continue to act as I have acted so far and that I may again and again recommence the same action under the same conditions. Dealing with the universal role of these idealizations for the foundation of logic and especially pure analytic, Husserl calls them the idealizations of the "and so on" and of the "I can do it again," the latter being the subjective correlate of the former.¹² To give an example: By an act of locomotion there came out of my reach - what was formerly "world within my reach." The shifting of the

¹² *Formale und transzendentale Logik*, Sec. 74, p. 167.

center θ of my system of coordinates has turned my former world in the *hie* into a world now in the *illic*.¹³ But under the idealization of the "I can do it again" I assume that I can retransform the actual *illic* into a new *hie*. My past world within my reach has under this idealization the character of a world which can be brought back again within my reach. Thus, for instance, my past manipulatory area continues to function in my present as a potential manipulatory area in the mode of *illic* and has now the character of a specific chance of restoration.*

As this first zone of potentiality is related with the past, so is the second one based upon anticipations of the future. Within my potential reach is also the world which neither is nor ever has been within my actual reach but which is nevertheless attainable under the idealization of "and so on" (*world within attainable reach*). The most important instance of this second zone of potentiality is the world within the actual reach of my contemporaneous fellow-man. For example, his manipulatory area does not - or at least does not entirely¹⁴ - coincide with my manipulatory area because it is only to him a manipulatory area in the mode of the *hie*, but to me in the mode of the *illic*. Nevertheless, it is my attainable manipulatory area which would be my actual manipulatory area if I were in his place and indeed will turn into an actual one by appropriate locomotions.¹⁵

What has been stated with respect to the manipulatory area of the contemporaneous fellow-man holds good quite generally for the world within your, within their, within someone's reach. This implies not only world within the Other's actual reach, but also worlds within his restorable or attainable reach, and the whole system thus extended over all the different strata of the social world shows altogether all the shades originating in the perspectives of sociality such as intimacy and anonymity, strangeness

¹³ The terminology follows that used by Husserl in his *Meditations Cartésiennes* Secs. 5₃ff.

¹⁴ In the face-to-face relation - and this is an additional peculiarity of this paramount social relationship - the world within my reach and that within my partner's reach overlap and there is at least a sector of a world within my and his common reach.

¹⁵ G. H. Mead in his essay "The Objective Reality of Perspectives," reprinted in the *Philosophy of the Present*, comes to a similar conclusion: "Present reality is a possibility. It is what would be if we were there instead of here" (p. 173).

* Cf. "Phenomenology and the Social Sciences," p. *itji*. and "Sartre's Theory of the Alter Ego," p. *zoif*. (M.N.)

and familiarity, social proximity and social distance, etc., which govern my relations with consociates, contemporaries, predecessors, and successors. All this cannot be treated here. For our purposes it is enough to show that the whole social world is a world within my attainable reach, having its specific chances of attainment.

Yet the specific chances of restoration, peculiar to the first, and of attainment, peculiar to the second zone of potentiality, are by no means equal. As to the former, we have to consider that what is now to me a mere chance of restorable reach was previously experienced by me as being within my actual reach. My past working acts performed and even the actions which in the past I had merely projected pertained to my world then within actual reach. On the other hand, they are related with my present state of mind which is as it is because the now past reality was once a present one. The anticipated possible reactualization of the once actual world within my reach is, therefore, founded upon reproductions and retentions of my own past experiences of fulfillments. The chance of restoring the once actual reach is, then, a maximal one.

The second zone of potentiality refers anticipatorily to future states of my mind. It is not connected with my past experiences, except by the fact that its anticipations (as all anticipations) originate in and have to be compatible with the stock of my past experiences actually at hand. These experiences enable me to weigh the likelihood of carrying out my plans and to estimate my powers. It is clear that this second zone is not at all homogeneous but subdivided into sectors of different chances of attainment. These chances diminish in proportion with the increasing spatial, temporal, and social distance of the respective sector from the actual center of my world of working. The greater the distance the more uncertain are my anticipations of the attainable actuality, until they become entirely empty and unrealizable.

j) The world of working as paramount reality; the fundamental anxiety; the epoche of the natural attitude

The world of working as a whole stands out as paramount over against the many other sub-universes of reality. It is the world of

physical things, including my body; it is the realm of my locomotions and bodily operations; it offers resistances which require effort to overcome; it places tasks before me, permits me to carry through my plans, and enables me to succeed or to fail in my attempt to attain my purposes. By my working acts I gear into the outer world, I change it; and these changes, although provoked by my working, can be experienced and tested both by myself and others, as occurrences within this world independently of my working acts in which they originated. I share this world and its objects with Others; with Others, I have ends and means in common; I work with them in manifold social acts and relationships, checking the Others and checked by them. And the world of working is the reality within which communication and the interplay of mutual motivation becomes effective. It can, therefore, be experienced under both schemes of reference, the causality of motives as well as the teleology of purposes.

As we stated before, this world is to our natural attitude in the first place not an object of our thought but a field of domination. We have an eminently practical interest in it, caused by the necessity of complying with the basic requirements of our life. But we are not *equally* interested in all the strata of the world of working. The selective function of our interest organizes the world in both respects - as to space and time - in strata of major or minor relevance. From the world within my actual or potential reach those objects are selected as primarily important which actually are or will become in the future possible ends or means for the realization of my projects, or which are or will become dangerous or enjoyable or otherwise relevant to me. I am constantly anticipating the future repercussions I may expect from these objects and the future changes my projected working will bring about with respect to them.

Let us make clearer what is meant by "relevance" in this context. I am, for instance, with the natural attitude, passionately interested in the results of my action and especially in the question whether my anticipations will stand the practical test. As we have seen before, all anticipations and plans refer to previous experiences now at hand, which enable me to weigh my chances. But that is only half the story. *What* I am anticipating is one thing, the other, *why* I anticipate certain occurrences at

all. What may happen under certain conditions and circumstances is one thing, the other, why I am interested in these happenings and why I should passionately await the outcome of my prophecies. It is only the first part of these dichotomies which is answered by reference to the stock of experiences at hand as the sediment of previous experiences. It is the second part of these dichotomies which refers to the system of relevances by which man within his natural attitude in daily life is guided.

We cannot unfold here all the implications of the problem of relevance, upon one aspect of which we have just touched. But in a word, we want to state that the whole system of relevances which governs us within the natural attitude is founded upon the basic experience of each of us: I know that I shall die and I fear to die. This basic experience we suggest calling the *fundamental anxiety*. It is the primordial anticipation from which all the others originate. From the fundamental anxiety spring the many interrelated systems of hopes and fears, of wants and satisfactions, of chances and risks which incite man within the natural attitude to attempt the mastery of the world, to overcome obstacles, to draft projects, and to realize them.

But the fundamental anxiety itself is merely a correlate of our existence as human beings within the paramount reality of daily life and, therefore, the hopes and fears and their correlated satisfactions and disappointments are grounded upon and only possible within the world of working. They are essential elements of its reality but they do not refer to our belief in it. On the contrary, it is characteristic of the natural attitude that it takes the world and its objects for granted until counterproof imposes itself. As long as the once established scheme of reference, the system of our and other people's warranted experiences works, as long as the actions and operations performed under its guidance yield the desired results, we trust these experiences. We are not interested in finding out whether this world really does exist or whether it is merely a coherent system of consistent appearances. We have no reason to cast any doubt upon our warranted experiences which, so we believe, give us things as they really are. It needs a special motivation, such as the irruption of a "strange" experience not subsumable under the stock of knowledge at hand or inconsistent with it, to make us revise our former beliefs.

Phenomenology has taught us the concept of phenomenological *epoche*, the suspension of our belief in the reality of the world as a device to overcome the natural attitude by radicalizing the Cartesian method of philosophical doubt.¹⁶ The suggestion may be ventured that man within the natural attitude also uses a specific *epoche*, of course quite another one than the phenomenologist. He does not suspend belief in the outer world and its objects, but on the contrary, he suspends doubt in its existence. What he puts in brackets is the doubt that the world and its objects might be otherwise than it appears to him. We propose to call this *epoche* the *epoche of the natural attitude*.^{16*}

¹⁶ Cf. Farber, *loc. cit.*, p. 526f.

* Although the point of view of the present paper differs in many respects from his, I should like to call attention to Herbert Spiegelberg's very interesting paper "The Reality-Phenomenon and Reality" in *Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl (op.cit.)* pp. 84-105, which attempts an analysis of dubitability and dubiousness with respect to reality. According to Spiegelberg, reality-criteria are the phenomena of readiness, persistence, perceptual periphery, boundaries in concrete objects, independence, resistance, and agreement,